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Abstract
Adversarial training, in which a network is trained on both
adversarial and clean examples, is one of the most trusted
defense methods against adversarial attacks. However, there
are three major practical difficulties in implementing and de-
ploying this method - expensive in terms of running memory
and computation costs; accuracy trade-off between clean and
adversarial examples; cannot foresee all adversarial attacks at
training time. Here, we present a new solution to ease these
three difficulties - Beneficial perturbation Networks (BPN).
BPN generates and leverages beneficial perturbations (some-
what opposite to well-known adversarial perturbations) as
biases within the parameter space of the network, to neutral-
ize the effects of adversarial perturbations on data samples.
Thus, BPN can effectively defend against adversarial exam-
ples. Compared to adversarial training, we demonstrate that
BPN can significantly reduce the required running memory
and computation costs, by generating beneficial perturbations
through recycling of the gradients computed from training on
clean examples. In addition, BPN can alleviate the accuracy
trade-off difficulty and the difficulty of foreseeing multiple at-
tacks, by improving the generalization of the network, thanks
to increased diversity of the training set achieved through neu-
tralization between adversarial and beneficial perturbations.
Introduction
Neural networks have lead to a series of breakthroughs in
many fields, such as image classification tasks [10, 3], and
natural language processing [6, 2]. Model performance on
clean examples was the main evaluation criterion for these
applications until the unveiling of weaknesses to adversarial
attacks by [20, 1]. Neural networks were shown to be vulner-
able to adversarial perturbations: carefully computed small
perturbations added to legitimate clean examples to create
so-called "adversarial examples" can cause misclassification
on state-of-the-art machine learning models. For example,
consider a task of recognizing handwritten digits "1" versus
"2" (Fig. 1 a1, a2). Adversarial perturbations aimed at mis-
classifying an image of digit 1 as digit 2 may be obtained
by backpropagating from the class digit 2 to the input space,
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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following any of the available adversarial directions. In input
space, adding adversarial perturbations to the input image
can be viewed as adding an adversarial direction vector (red
arrows δAP ) to the clean (non-perturbated) input image of
digit 1. The resulting vector crosses the decision boundary.
As a consequence, adversarial perturbations can force the
neural network into misclassification, here from digit 1 to
digit 2. Thus, building a deep learning system that can ro-
bustly classify both adversarial examples and clean examples
has emerged as a critical requirement.
Researchers have proposed a number of adversarial de-
fense strategies to increase the robustness of deep learning
systems. Adversarial training [8, 11], in which a network is
trained on both adversarial examples (xadv) and clean exam-
ples (xcln) with class labels y, is perhaps the most popular
defense against adversarial attacks, withstanding strong at-
tacks. Adversarial examples are the summation of adversarial
perturbations lying inside the input space (δAP ) and clean
examples: xadv = xcln + δAP . Given a classifier with a
classification loss function L and parameters θ, the objective
function of adversarial training is:
min
θ
L(xadv, xcln, y; θ) (1)
After adversarial training, the network learns a new de-
cision boundary to incorporate both clean and adversarial
examples (Fig. 1 a2, a3).
Despite the efficacy of adversarial training in building
a robust system, there are three major practical difficulties
while implementing and deploying this method. Difficulty
one: adversarial training is expensive in terms of running
memory and computation costs (Fig. 2 a). Producing an ad-
versarial example requires multiple gradient computations.
In a practical scenario, we further produce more than one
adversarial examples for each clean example [21]. Most im-
plementations need to at least double the amount of running
memory on GPU, to store those adversarial examples along-
side the clean examples. In addition, during adversarial train-
ing, the network has to train on both clean and adversarial
examples; hence, adversarial training typically requires at
least twice the computation power than just training on clean
examples. For example, even on reasonably-sized datasets,
such as ImageNet, adversarial training can take multiple days
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Figure 1: Difference between adversarial training (a1 - a3, input space) and BPN (b1 - b3, activation space) on recognizing
handwritten digits "1" versus "2". (a1): After training a model on clean input images, digits "1" and "2" are separated by a purple
decision boundary. (a2): Adding adversarial perturbations to test input images of digit 1 can be viewed as adding adversarial
direction vectors (red arrows δAP ) to the clean (non-perturbated) input images. Such adversarial vectors cross the decision
boundary, forcing the neural network into misclassification (here from digit 1 to digit 2). (a3): Adversarial training: training
a model on both clean and adversarial examples learns a new decision boundary to incorporate both clean and adversarial
examples, but at great computation and running memory cost. (b1) and (b2) are similar to (a1) and (a2), but they are represented
in activation space. (b3): BPN. Beneficial perturbations are opposite to the effects in activation space of adversarial perturbations
applied to inputs. Adding beneficial perturbations to the activation representation of adversarial examples can be viewed as
adding beneficial direction vectors (green arrows δBP ) to the representations of adversarial examples of digit 1. The resulting
vectors cross the decision boundary and drag the misclassified adversarial examples back to the correct classification region.
on a single GPU. [12] used 53 P100 GPUs and [24] used
100 V100s for target adversarial training on ImageNet. As a
consequence, although adversarial training remains among
the most trusted defenses, it has only been within reach of
research labs having hundreds of GPUs. Difficulty two: ac-
curacy trade-off between clean examples and adversarial
examples - although adversarial training can improve the ro-
bustness against adversarial examples, it sometimes hurts
accuracy on clean examples. Thus, there is an accuracy trade-
off between the adversarial examples and clean examples
[7, 18, 19, 25]. Because most of the test data in real appli-
cations are clean examples, test accuracy on clean examples
should be as good as possible. Thus, this accuracy trade-
off hinders the practical usefulness of adversarial training
because it often ends up lowering performance on clean ex-
amples. Difficulty three: impractical to foresee multiple
attacks - even though one might have sufficient computation
resources to train a network on both adversarial and clean
examples, it is unrealistic and expensive to introduce all un-
known attack samples into the adversarial training. For exam-
ple, [21] proposed Ensemble Adversarial Training which can
increase the diversity of adversarial perturbations in a train-
ing set by generating adversarial perturbations transferred
from other models (they won the competition on Defenses
against Adversarial Attacks), but again at an extraordinary
computation and running memory cost. Thus, broad diversity
of adversarial examples is crucial for adversarial training.
In this paper, we introduce Beneficial Perturbations Net-
work (BPN) to address these three difficulties. BPN generates
and leverages beneficial perturbations (somewhat opposite
to well-known adversarial perturbations) as biases within
the parameter space of the network, to neutralize the effects
of adversarial perturbations on data samples. We evaluated
BPN on three datasets (MNIST, FashionMNIST and TinyIm-
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Figure 2: Difference in training pipelines between adversar-
ial training and BPN to defend against adversarial examples.
(a) classical adversarial training has two steps: (1) Generating
adversarial perturbations from corresponding clean examples
and adding adversarial perturbations to the clean examples
(creation of adversarial examples). (2) Training the network,
usually on both clean and adversarial examples. (b) BPN cre-
ates a shortcut with only one step: training on clean examples.
The feasibility of shortcut is because BPN can generate ben-
eficial perturbations during the training of clean examples,
with negligible additional costs. Thus, BPN reduces at least
half computation and running memory costs compared to typ-
ical adversarial training. The learned beneficial perturbations
can neutralize the effects of adversarial perturbations of the
data samples at test time.
ageNet). Our results show:
(1) When training only on clean examples (our main use
case scenario), BPN achieved good classification accuracy on
adversarial examples, while saving at least half of the com-
putation and running memory costs compared to standard
adversarial training. The saving is because BPN creates a
shortcut (Fig. 2 b) compared to adversarial training (Fig. 2 a).
The feasibility of the shortcut is because BPN can generate
beneficial perturbations (which can be used to neutralize the
effects of adversarial perturbations of the data samples at
test time) during the training of clean examples. In contrast,
adversarial training requires training on both clean and adver-
sarial examples. For example, on TinyImageNet dataset, BPN
achieved 53.29% accuracy on adversarial examples, 3575%
better than the performance of classical network (baseline)
trained on clean examples only.
(2) When slightly more computation is available, one can
also train BPN on adversarial examples only. BPN alleviated
the accuracy trade-off by increasing the diversity of the train-
ing set. BPN boosted the classification accuracy on both clean
and adversarial examples because the diversification of the
training set - the extracted beneficial perturbations would con-
vert some adversarial examples into clean examples through
the neutralization (Eqn. 2). For quantitative results, on Tiny-
ImageNet dataset, BPN achieved 20.69% and 79.92% correct
classification on clean and adversarial examples, 10.8% and
16.63% better than the performance of the classical network
(baseline) trained on adversarial examples only.
(3) When more computation and GPU memory are avail-
able, BPN can be trained on both clean and adversarial ex-
amples. In this case, BPN improved the generalization of
the network through the diversification of the training set.
Thus, it improved classification accuracy on both clean and
adversarial examples. For example, on TinyImageNet dataset,
BPN achieved 66.84% and 88.16% correct classification on
clean and adversarial examples, 0.4% and 2.81% better than
the performance of classical network (baseline) trained on
both clean and adversarial examples.
Related Work and background information
Beneficial perturbations for overcoming
catastrophic forgetting:
[22] used bias units to store the beneficial perturbations (op-
posite to the well-known adversarial perturbations). [22]
showed that the beneficial perturbations, stored inside task-
dependent bias units, can bias the network outputs toward the
correct classification region for each task, allowing a single
neural network to have multiple input to output mappings.
Multiple input to output mappings alleviate the catastrophic
forgetting problem [16] in sequential learning scenarios (a
previously learned mapping of an old task is erased during
learning of a new mapping for a new task).
Beneficial Perturbation Network (BPN)
Understanding beneficial perturbations
To understand beneficial perturbations in more detail, we first
revisit the meaning of adversarial perturbations in adversarial
examples. With adversarial examples [20], it has been shown
that noise patterns (calculated from a specific class) added to
input images can bias a network to misclassify the perturbed
input images into that specific class. Here, we leverage this
idea, but, instead of adding input "noise" (adversarial pertur-
bations) calculated from other classes to force the network
into misclassification, we add "noise" (beneficial perturba-
tions) calculated from the input’s own correct class to assist
correct classification. Instead of adding perturbations to the
input images, during the training of clean examples, we up-
date the bias term in each layer of the neural network to store
the beneficial perturbations by recycling gradient information
already computed. During testing on adversarial examples,
the stored beneficial perturbations can neutralize adversarial
perturbations on data samples. Thus, BPN can make correct
classification on adversarial examples. For example, in acti-
vation space (Fig. 1 b2, b3), consider a task of recognizing
handwritten digits "1" versus "2". Adding beneficial perturba-
tions to the activation representation of adversarial examples
can be viewed as adding an beneficial direction vector (green
arrows δBP ) to the adversarial examples of digit 1. The re-
sulting vector crosses the decision boundary and drag the
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Figure 4: BPN extension to deep convolutional neural network. Deep convolutional neural network are made with two parts:
feature extraction part (convolutional and non-linear layers) and classifier part (fully connected layer). We introduce beneficial
perturbation bias (replace the normal bias term) to the last few fully connected layers of the deep convolutional network and
update them using FGSM.
misclassified adversarial examples back to the correct classi-
fication region. Thus, the beneficial perturbations neutralize
the effects of the adversarial perturbations and recover the
clean examples
xcln ≈ xcln + δAP + δBP (2)
since δAP and δBP cancel out. As a result, instead of up-
dating the decision boundary by training on both clean and
adversarial examples, BPN can correctly classify both clean
and adversarial examples by training only on clean examples
without updating its decision boundary.
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Figure 3: Structure difference between normal network (base-
line) and BPN for forward (a-b) and backward pass (c-d).
(a) Forward rules of normal network (baseline). (b) Forward
rules of BPN. Beneficial perturbation bias (bi−1BP ) is the same
as normal bias (bi−1) in forward pass. (c) Backward rules of
normal network (baseline). We only demonstrated the update
rules for normal bias term. (d) Backward rules of BPN. The
difference is that we update the beneficial perturbations bias
term using FGSM.
Formulation of beneficial perturbations
Beneficial perturbations are formulated as an additive contri-
bution to each layer’s weighted activations (Fig. 3 b):
V i =W i−1V i−1 + bi−1BP (3)
where W i−1, V i−1 and bi−1BP is the weight, activation and
beneficial perturbation bias at layer i− 1. Beneficial pertur-
bation bias has the same structure as the normal bias term b
(Fig. 3 a), but it is used to store the beneficial perturbations
(δBP ).
Instead of adding input "noise" (adversarial perturbations)
to input space calculated from other classes to force the net-
work into misclassification, we can add "noise" (beneficial
perturbations δBP ) to the activation space calculated by the
input’s own correct class to assist in correct classification.
Thus, the beneficial perturbations at each layer i is obtained
by updating beneficial perturbation bias using the Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method (FGSM; [8]) with the input’s own correct
class:
biBP = b
i
BP + η db
i
BP (4)
dbiBP =  sign(∇biBPL(b
i
BP , ytrue, θ)) (5)
where η is the learning rate, biBP is the beneficial perturbation
bias, dbiBP is the gradient for beneficial perturbation bias, 
is a hyperparameter to decide how strong we go to the Fast
Gradient Sign direction, ytrue is the true label (input’s own
correct class), θ is the parameters of neural network.
Coincidentally, we always use the input’s own correct class
to train a neural network. Thus, we can generate the gradient
for beneficial perturbations at layer i − 1 by recycling the
computed gradients while we are training the network (Fig. 3
d). We use Eqn. 6 to replace the Eqn. 5:
dbi−1BP =  sign(
∑
Grad) (6)
where, dbi−1BP is the gradient for beneficial perturbations bias,
Grad is the gradient from next layer i,  is same as Eqn. 5.
Thus, to generate beneficial perturbations, we do not intro-
duce any extra computation costs beyond FGSM. The for-
ward (backward) pass computation costs of BPN are only
0.00% (0.006%) more than the costs of classical network
training on the clean examples (Tab. 1). This feature enables
BPN to save at least half of computation and running memory
costs compared to standard adversarial training (Fig. 2).
network
Computation
cost Forward(FLOPS)
Backward
(FLOPS)
Classical Network
(ResNet-50) 51,112,224 51,112,225
BPN (ResNet-50) 51,112,224 51,115,321
Table 1: Computation costs of BPN trained on clean examples
compared to a classical network trained on clean examples on
RestNet-50. For forward (backward) pass, The computation
costs of BPN are 0.00% (0.006%) more than the classical
network.
Extend the BPN to deep convolutional network
Most deep convolutional neural networks are made with two
parts: a feature extraction part (convolutional and non-liear
layers) and a classifier (fully connected layer). Here, we in-
troduce beneficial perturbations bias (bBP ) to the last few
fully connected layers of the deep convolutional network, re-
placing the normal bias term (Fig. 4). We use FGSM (Eqn. 6)
to update those beneficial perturbation biases.
In summary, through the training of clean examples, BPN
generates beneficial perturbations as biases within the last
few fully connected layer of the deep neural network. BPN
leverages these beneficial perturbations to defend against
future adversarial examples by neutralizing the effects of
adversarial perturbations in the datasets. In addition, if BPN
is trained on adversarial examples alone or on a combination
of adversarial and clean examples, the neutralization can di-
versify the training set by converting adversarial examples to
clean examples. As a consequence, the diversification further
improves the generalization of the BPN. The generalization
eases the difficulties of accuracy trade-off and impracticabil-
ity to foresee multiple attacks.
Experiments
Datasets
MNIST. MNIST [14] is a dataset with handwritten digits, has
a training set of 60,000 examples, and a test set of 10,000 ex-
amples. FashionMnist. FashionMnist [23] is a dataset with
article images, has a training set of 60,000 examples, and a
test set of 10,000 examples. TinyImageNet. TinyImageNet
is a subset of the ImageNet [4] - a large visual datasets. Tiny-
ImageNet consists of 200 classes and has a training set of
100k examples, and a test set of 10k examples.
Network structure
For MNIST and FashionMNIST (LeNet). We use the con-
volutional and non-linear layers of LeNet as feature extrac-
tion part [14] (classical LeNet). Then, for classifier part, we
create our version of LeNet (LeNet with beneficial perturba-
tion bias) by adding beneficial perturbation bias into the fully
connected layers, replacing the normal bias. For TinyIma-
geNet (ResNet-18). We use the convolutional and non-linear
layers of ResNet-18 [9] as feature extraction part (classi-
cal ResNet-18). Then, We use three fully connected layer
with 1028 hidden units as classifier. We create our version
of ResNet-18 (ResNet-18 with beneficial perturbation bias)
by adding beneficial perturbation bias into the fully con-
nected layers, replacing the normal bias. We trained the BPN
(ResNet-18) with 5000 epoches on TinyImageNet.
Various attack methods
To demonstrate how BPN can successfully defend against
a broad range of adversarial attacks, we tested our BPN
structure on adversarial examples generated from various
attack methods:
(1,2,3) PGD Linf, L2, L1 [15]: Projected Gradient Descend
Attack with order = Linf, L2, L1. (4) Basic Iterative Attack
L2 [13]: Perturbing the input with gradient of the loss with
respect to the input and with several step for each epsilon.
(5) FGSM [8]: One step fast gradient sign method. (6) Aka
Basic Iterative Attack [13]: Like GradientSignAttack, but
with several steps for each epsilon.
Results
BPN can defend adversarial examples with
additional negligible computation costs
When the neural network can only be trained on clean ex-
amples because of modest computation power, BPN can
achieve much better test accuracy on adversarial examples
than the classical network (baseline, Tab. 2, MNIST: 98.88%
vs. 18.08%, FashionMNIST: 54.07% vs. 11.87%, TinyIma-
geNet: 53.29% vs. 1.45% ). Thus, for companies with modest
computation resources, BPN can help a system achieve mod-
erate robustness against adversarial examples, while only
introducing additional negligible computation costs (e.g., on
FashionMNIST, our method only uses 59% training time
compared to the training time of adversarial training with
just one adversarial example per clean example, saving 43.51
minutes training time for 500 training epochs on an NVIDIA
Tesla-V100 platform (We only introduced one Sign and one
multiplication operation for each fully connected layer Tab. 1.
The reason of extra 9% costs is because we create a custom
layer in Pytorch framework. The framework introduces a
lot of overheads for custom layer. It should be greatly im-
proved if the custom layers is incorporated in the Pytorch
framework with C++ implementation. This would eliminate
the overheads for custom layer and reduce the extra costs to
0.006%). The saving would be huge on a larger dataset such
as Imagenet [5]).
BPN can alleviate the accuracy trade-off through
the diversification of the training set
BPN can alleviate the accuracy trade-off difficulty and in-
crease the classification accuracy for both clean and adversar-
ial examples. Although training a classical neural network A
on adversarial examples can achieve a high test accuracy on
Table 2: Training on clean examples for BPN and classical
network (CN). Testing on clean examples (Cln Ex) and ad-
versarial examples (Adv Ex) (generated by FGSM,  = 0.3
for MNIST, FashionMNIST and TinyImageNet). CN does
poorly on adversarial examples. While, BPN can successfully
defend adversarial examples.
Datasets &
network structure
MNIST
LeNet
FasMNIST
LeNet
TinyImageNet
ResNet-18
Cln Ex BPN 99.17 89.53 57.55CN 99.01 89.17 64.30
Adv Ex BPN 98.88 54.07 53.29CN 18.08 11.87 1.45
adversarial examples (Tab. 3, MNIST: 99.01%, FashionM-
NIST: 91.49%, TinyImageNet: 68.52%), it hurts test accuracy
on clean examples. Compared to a classical network B trained
on clean examples, the test accuracy on clean examples of
classical network A decreases from 99.01%, 89.17%, 64.30%
(Tab. 2) to 95.54%, 65,64%, 18.67% (Tab. 3) for MNIST,
FashionMNIST and ImageNet datasets. In comparison to
classical network B, by training BPN only on adversarial
examples, BPN not only achieves better test accuracy on
adversarial examples (Tab. 3, MNIST: 99.27%, FashionM-
NIST: 92.07%, TinyImageNet: 79.92%), but also achieves
a better test accuracy on clean examples (Tab. 3, MNIST:
97.32%, FashionMNIST: 71.54%, TinyImageNet: 20.69%).
This accuracy on clean examples is still worse than that of
classical network B (training only on clean examples), but
it is much better than the accuracy of classical network A
(training only on adversarial examples). The reason is that
beneficial perturbations would convert some adversarial ex-
amples into clean examples because of the neutralization
(Eqn. 2). As a consequence, the increased diversity of the
clean examples improves the generalization of BPN.
Table 3: Training on adversarial examples for BPN and clas-
sical network (CN). Testing on clean examples (Cln Ex) and
adversarial examples (Adv Ex) (generated by FGSM,  =
0.3 for MNIST , FashionMNIST and ImageNet). BPN can
achieve a better classification accuracy on clean examples
than CN.
Datasets &
network structure
MNIST
LeNet
FasMNIST
LeNet
TinyImageNet
ResNet-18
Cln Ex BPN 97.32 71.54 20.69CN 95.54 65.64 18.67
Adv Ex BPN 99.27 92.07 79.92CN 99.01 91.49 68.52
BPN can improve generalization through
diversification of the training set
Training a classical network on both clean and adversarial ex-
amples can achieve good test accuracy on both clean and ad-
versarial examples. By diversifying the training set, BPN can
achieve even better test accuracy. BPN can achieve slightly
higher accuracy on clean examples than the classical network
(Tab. 4 MNIST 99.13% vs. 99.09%, FashionMNIST 89.65%
vs. 89.49%, TinyImageNet 66.84% vs. 66.56% ). In addition,
BPN can achieve higher accuracy on adversarial examples
than classical Network MNIST 97.62% vs. 97.01%, Fash-
ionMNIST 95.39% vs. 94.98%, TinyImageNet 88.16% vs.
85.75%). The reason is that the generalization of BPN can be
improved through diversification of the training set caused by
neutralization (Eqn. 2). BPN and classical network can both
achieve high accuracy in this scenario. However, we should
normally avoid this scenario because training on both clean
and adversarial examples is expensive in terms of running
memory and computation costs.
Table 4: Training on both clean and adversarial examples for
BPN and classical network (CN).Testing on clean examples
(Cln Ex) and adversarial examples (Adv Ex) (generated by
FGSM,  = 0.3 for MNIST, FashionMNIST and ImageNet).
Both BPN and CN can achieve a high classification accu-
racy. However, we should avoid this scenario because of the
expensive running memory and computation costs.
Datasets &
network structure
MNIST
LeNet
FasMNIST
LeNet
TinyImageNet
ResNet-18
Cln Ex BPN 99.13 89.65 66.84CN 99.09 89.49 66.56
Adv Ex BPN 97.62 95.39 88.16CN 97.01 94.98 85.75
Influence of adversarial perturbation budget
The higher the adversarial perturbation budget, the higher the
chance it can successfully attack a neural network. However,
attacks with higher adversarial perturbation budgets are easier
to detect by a program or by humans. For example,  = 0.3
(Fig. 5a) represents very high noise, which makes FashionM-
NIST images difficult to classify, even by humans. But the
distribution differences between the adversarial examples and
clean examples are so large that they can be easily captured
by defense programs. Thus,  ≤ 0.15 is a good attack since
the differences caused by adversarial perturbations are too
small to be detected by most defense programs. For small
adversarial perturbations (Fig. 5b  ≤ 0.15), by just training
on clean images, BPN achieves moderate robustness against
adversarial examples with negligible costs. Thus, it is really
beneficial to adapt our method for companies with modest
computation power, who still want to achieve moderate ro-
bustness against adversarial examples.
BPN can successfully defend various attack
methods
When the neural network can only be trained on clean exam-
ples because of modest computation power, we trained BPN
on clean examples and tested on adversarial examples gener-
ated by various attack methods discussed in the experiments
section.
From Tab. 5, BPN can successfully defend various attack
methods. Particularly, BPN can achieve better classification
accuracy than classical network for PGD Linf, PGD L2, PGD
Table 5: Training on clean examples of MNIST and TinyImageNet for BPN and classical network (CN). Testing on adversarial
examples generated by a variety of adversarial attack methods. BPN can successfully defend those adversarial examples.
Dataset
& network
Attacks
PGD Linf PGD L2 PGD L1 Basic IterativeAttack L2
Aka Basic
Iterative Attack FGSM
MNIST BPN 95.41 98.52 98.64 98.52 11.35 98.35CN 2.18 97.26 98.91 97.24 9.74 17.53
TinyImageNet BPN 44.37 16.23 16.23 16.23 5.9 52.39CN 0.00 15.11 15.12 15.11 0.5 1.29
0.9835 0.982 0.9834 0.9874 0.9835 0.9888
0.7114 0.6946 0.6875 0.6905 0.6867 0.6761
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Figure 5: (a) Adversarial example with high adversarial per-
turbation budget ( = 0.3). (b) Test accuracy on adversarial
examples after training BPN only on clean examples from
MNIST (Blue) or FashionMNIST (Orange) datasets.
L1, Basic Iterative Attack L2, Aka Basic iterative Attack and
FGSM. However, despite the excellent performance of BPN
on PGD Linf and FGSM, the performances on PGD L2, PGD
L1, Basic Iterative Attack L2 and Aka Basic Iterative Attack
are moderate. We will discuss how to further improve BPN
on a variety of attack methods in the discussion section.
Discussion
We proposed a new solution for defending against adversarial
examples, which we refer to as Beneficial Perturbation Net-
work (BPN). BPN, for the first time, leverages the beneficial
perturbations (opposite to well-known adversarial perturba-
tions) to counteract the effects of adversarial perturbations
input data. Compared to adversarial training, this approach
introduces there main advantages - (1) We demonstrated that
BPN can effectively defend adversarial examples with negli-
gible additional running memory and computation costs. (2)
We demonstrated that BPN can alleviate the accuracy trade-
off by increasing the diversity of the training set. (3) Further,
we demonstrated the increased diversity of the training set
can improve generalization of the network by converting
some adversarial examples into clean examples.
Beneficial perturbations: the opposite "twins" of ad-
versarial perturbations Beneficial perturbations can be
viewed as the opposite "twins" of adversarial perturbations.
Much research is underway on how to generate more and
more advanced adversarial perturbations [15, 13, 20, 17, 8,
13] to fool the more and more sophisticated machine learning
systems. However, there is a little research [22] on how to
generate beneficial perturbations and possible applications of
beneficial perturbations.
Future Beneficial Perturbations research In this re-
search, we use one of the easiest method (FGSM) available
in the adversarial perturbations world [8] to generate bene-
ficial perturbations. We demonstrated that using beneficial
perturbations can effectively defend adversarial examples by
neutralizing the effects of adversarial perturbations of data
samples. More research could be done to improve BPN -
(1) Updating rules of Beneficial perturbations: other than
FGSM implemented in this paper, one could use other meth-
ods (e.g., PGD) to update the beneficial perturbation bias. As
a consequence, BPN might be more robust to various kinds
of adversarial examples. (2) Network structure for storing
and generating beneficial perturbations: in this paper, we
used beneficial perturbation biases to store and generate the
beneficial perturbations. The structure of the beneficial per-
turbation biases is the same as normal bias. Then, we replace
the normal bias term of the last few fully connected layers
of deep convolutional networks with our beneficial perturba-
tion bias. This approach might not be the optimal structure
to store and generate beneficial perturbations. It might be
better to embed the beneficial perturbations into the earlier
convolutional and non-linear layers of the deep convolutional
network to store and generate those beneficial perturbations
more effectively and efficiently.
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